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The Continuing Validity of Seniority Systems Under
Title VII: Sharing the Burden of Discrimination
INTRODUCTION
The impact of collective bargaining agreements on all sectors of
the economy is demonstrated by the widespread interest in the expi-
ration of major industrial contracts. Although disputes over wages
normally attract the most public attention, a lesser publicized, but
more deeply entrenched provision of collective bargaining agree-
ments has potentially the farthest-reaching effects. This is the sen-
iority provision.' The notion of seniority is as old as organized labor
itself. Protection against discharge and layoff forms the basis of job
security for workers and seems to be the most important reason for
the prevalence of seniority provisions in collective bargaining agree-
ments. Indeed, almost every major industry has adopted seniority
clauses in its union contracts.' This article will analyze the continu-
ing validity of such seniority systems in light of their demonstrated
impact on minorities, whose rights to equal employment opportuni-
ties are guaranteed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4
Focusing on two Supreme Court decisions,' as well as on several
lower court rulings,' this article will examine whether Title VII
objectives are being achieved.
The Court's characterization of the impact of Title VII indicates
that a sharing of the burden of past discrimination is "presumptive
1. See generally H. DAVEY, CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (3d ed. 1972); F. HARBI-
SON, THE SENIORITY PRINCIPLE IN UNION-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (1939); S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY
& E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT (1960); Aaron,
Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Aaron].
2. D. MATER, THE RAILROAD SENIORITY SYSTEM 387, 394 (1941); see Poplin, Fair Employ-
ment in a Depressed Economy: The Layoff Problem, 23 UCLA L. REv. 177, 196 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Poplin].
3. In a recent survey, 92% of collective bargaining agreements contained seniority provi-
sions. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 85 (8th ed. 1975).
4. Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, §§ 700-16, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2 0 0 0e to 2000e-17
(1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. IV 1974).
5. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971).
6. These cases, in order of consideration, are: Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp.
505 (E.D. Va. 1968); Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976); Watkins v. Steelworkers Local 2369, 516 F.2d
41 (5th Cir. 1975); Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local Unions IBEW, 508 F.2d 687
(3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 425 U.S. 987 (1976); Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976);
Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), on rehearing, 534 F.2d 1007 (1976).
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necessary."' The delayed entry of blacks, women, and other
minorities into the mainstream of employment has had a continu-
ing adverse effect on these groups: failure to attain the seniority
rights they would have earned in the absence of discrimination.
This impact is as broad as the benefits that a seniority system is
designed to bestow and protect. Of these, hiring, promotions,
transfers, and layoffs are among the most significant. In many situa-
tions victims of past discrimination cannot be "made whole" in the
absence of some alteration of the seniority rights of other employ-
ees.
8
A sharing of the burden of past discrimination necessarily in-
volves at least four groups: (1) the ostensible victims-minorities
and women-for whom the effect of relief may vary significantly
depending upon whether it is addressed to individuals or to a class
as a whole; (2) the white male employees who may become victims
themselves, depending on the scope of a court award, as a result of
their employer's and/or union's discriminatory practices; (3) the
employers who have practiced discrimination in hiring, promotion,
and transfers; and (4) the unions, who may have played a role in
discriminatory employment practices.
The author suggests that judicial constructions of the remedial
provisions of Title VII have not dealt squarely with the troublesome
issues raised by seniority systems. The confusing legislative history
of Title VII has prompted some courts to misplace their emphasis
when relying upon it. Because of these deficiencies, more imagina-
tive solutions are necessary if victims of discrimination are to be
made whole.
SENIORITY SYSTEMS
Seniority provides a seemingly objective standard for the employ-
ment relationship on which employers, unions, and employees can
rely. Length of service, either solely or in conjunction with other
factors, determines priority for benefits such as promotions, trans-
fers, order of layoff and recall, working conditions, overtime oppor-
tunities, vacation scheduling, and a host of other aspects of working
life. Such "competitive status" seniority benefits are only one phase
of the impact of the seniority system. The other phase, "benefit
seniority," affects length of vacation, pension benefits, and pay
7. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777 (1976).
8. The Supreme Court stated the purpose of Title VII was to "make persons whole for
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination." Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 415, 418 (1975). The Supreme Court reaffirmed this in Franks, 424 U.S.
at 762.
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raise schedules.9 However, it is principally the former type which
engenders conflicts between workers who have gained these rights,
and those deprived of the opportunities for such status because of
employer or union discrimination. "Competitive status" seniority
reflects the relative rights of employees competing for the most de-
sirable rewards based on length of service. If Title VII relief awards
a victim enhanced seniority of this type, it would have the concomi-
tant effect of reducing the importance of the actual seniority of other
employees. Guiltless employees would then compete with a greater
number of workers for the same number of benefits.
Unions appear to be totally dedicated to ensuring the future of the
senority system. Their support seems to stem from several factors:
(1) employees are able to predict their future employment status
with reasonable accuracy; (2) seniority diminishes the possibility of
capricious or arbitrary management decisions regarding allocation
of duties and benefits; and (3) the seniority system facilitates union
supervision of disputes among its members on an impartial basis.'
While few employers would argue that the seniority system im-
proves productivity, it does offer management some advantages.
The seniority system reduces the possibility of employee discontent
from management decisions which favor one employee over another
on some unsubstantiated basis. Since seniority grants valuable in-
centives for workers to remain with the same employer, manage-
ment is better able to retain its most valued employees. Further-
more, some systems assure that employees have the requisite expe-
rience to move up the job progression ladder."
The legal status of seniority rights is unclear. Supreme Court
decisions 2 and leading commentators 3 agree that they are not inde-
feasibly vested rights, and so may be modified by statute or in
9. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-14, MAJOR COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: ADMINISTRATION OF SENIORITY 7 (1972).
10. Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1598, 1604-05
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Cooper & Soboll.
11. Id. at 1607. For example, a department in a factory may be rigidly structured in such
a way that the foreman will have spent a certain amount of time working at every job in the
department: each job above the entry position would incorporate the skills learned at the level
just below, together with new skills to be mastered before another promotion is possible.
12. A conference report accompanying the 1972 amendments to Title VII asserted that
claims under Title VII involve the vindication of a major public interest. Section-by-Section
Analysis of H.R. 1746, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 118 CONG. REC. 7166,
7168 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Section-by-Section Analysis]. Supreme Court decisions
recognizing the power to modify seniority rights include Tilton v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 376 U.S.
169 (1964) and Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
13. Aaron, supra note 1, at 1534-42; Cooper & Sobol, supra note 10, at 1605.
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furtherance of public policy. Courts further recognize that they may
be modified by collective bargaining agreements." This apparent
agreement on what seniority rights are not, however, has not led to
any agreement on what they are. The fact that Title VII makes
specific reference to seniority systems indicates, perhaps, that Con-
gress wished to accord some deference to rights earned under non-
discriminatory systems.
TITLE VII: CONGRESSIONAL OBJECTIVES
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 established certain non-
discrimination requirements. Section 703(a) of the Act broadly de-
fines unlawful employment practices for employers. 5 They may not
engage in practices which would "in any way . . . deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee" on account of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Section 703(c) contains similar pros-
criptions with respect to unions."' Another Title VII provision merits
mention at this point. Section 706(g) grants considerable latitude
to the court to fashion equitable remedies, including the power to
"order such affirmative action as may be appropriate."' 7
14. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330, 337-39 (1953).
15. Section 703(a) states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
16. Section 703(c) states:
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership,
or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunties,
or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individ-
ual in violation of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970).
17. The text of section 706(g) is set out more fully below:
(g) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
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There are, however, several exemptions from. the general prohibi-
tions of the Act, including that in section 703(h):
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system . . . provided that such differences are
not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. .... ,.
The difficulties experienced by the courts in dealing with this
exemption language reflect, to a large degree, the confused state of
the legislative history accompanying it. There are no committee
reports to explain the exemption-it did not appear in the House
bill,'" the Senate bill bypassed the committee stage altogether, and
the compromise bill after Senate passage was an informal effort in
which a joint committee did not participate. The insertion in the
Congressional Record of several memoranda which appear incon-
sistent with the language in the Act compounds the problem. 0 Al-
though this history has been extensively analyzed,2 ' it is sufficiently
murky to withstand further scrutiny. It is anomalous that the legis-
lators expressed their awareness of the acute need for legislative
history to assist courts in interpreting the Civil Rights Act, yet
failed so egregiously, at least with respect to the seniority issue, to
provide a unified, coherent statement of intent. 22
Legislative History
The bill on which the Act is based originated in the House of
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as
the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice) ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
19. The House Report was prepared before the seniority provisions were added to the Act.
See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 431, 443-44 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Vaas].
20. See notes 28-30 infra.
21. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 10, at 1607-14; Poplin, supra note 2, at 189-94; Sheeran,
Title VII and Layoffs Under the "Last Hired, First Fired" Seniority Rule: The Preservation
of Equal Employment, 26 CASE W. RES. L. Rav. 409, 416-23 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Sheeran]; Vaas, supra note 19; Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent
Negro, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1260 (1967).
22. "Seldom has similar legislation been debated with greater consciousness of the need
for 'legislative history,' or with greater care in the making thereof, to guide the courts in
interpreting and applying the law." Vaas, supra note 19, at 444.
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Representatives and went to the Senate with its anti-discrimination
language virtually unchanged. 23 It contained no reference to senior-
ity systems. Representative Dowdy introduced an amendment ex-
empting seniority systems from the Act's application, but the
amendment was neither discussed nor debated on the House floor
before its defeat.2 A dissenting minority of the House Judiciary
Committee argued that the bill, under the guise of protecting the
civil rights of certain minorities, would destroy the civil rights of all
citizens affected by it, and would destroy seniority as well. 5 The
bill's sponsors in the House gave certain assurances, principally
emphasizing the limited role of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), which were sufficient to secure the bill's pas-
sage .2
The Senate proved less tractable. The bill went to the Senate floor
without the seniority provision,27 and an extended filibuster ensued.
Opponents of the bill expressed fear for the "vested" rights of
whites. On April 8, 1964, the bill's co-sponsors, Senators Clark and
Case, presumably attempted to quell the brewing storm by intro-
ducing three documents into the Congressional Record. One was
their own interpretative memorandum dealing with the seniority
and racial quota issues. 2 Another was an interpretative memoran-
23. H.R. 7152 (1963); see H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
24. 110 CONG. REC. 2727-28 (1964). The amendment reads:
The provisions of this title shall not be applicable to any employer whose hiring
and employment practices are pursuant to (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit sys-
tem; (3) a system which predicates its practices upon ability to produce either in
quantity or quality; or (4) a determination based on any factor other than race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Commentators have noted an obvious defect in that the amendment appears to exempt
employers, not seniority practices. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 10, at 1609.
25. Minority Report Upon Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1963, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), in UNITED STATES EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF TITLE VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 2064, 2066 [hereinafter cited as EEOC
HISTORY].
26. Id. at 2150.
27. 110 CONG. REc. 2804 (1964).
28. Id. at 7207. The relevant portion of this memorandum is as follows:
First, it has been asserted that Title VII would undermine vested rights of senior-
ity. This is not correct. Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing
at the time it takes effect. If, for example, a collective bargaining agreement pro-
vides that in the event of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first,
such a provision would not be affected in the least by Title VII. This would be true
even in the case where owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of the title,
white workers had more seniority than Negroes. . . .It is perfectly clear that when
a worker is laid off or denied a chance for promotion because under established
seniority rules he is "low man on the totem pole" he is not being discriminated
against because of his race.
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dum prepared by the Department of Justice for Senator Clark. 9 The
third was a series of prepared responses to questions posed by Sena-
tor Dirksen. 30 The thrust of the three documents was to emphasize
the minimal effect of Title VII on existing seniority rights. There
was no floor debate or commentary on these materials.
At a later date, an informal committee undertook the task of
preparing various amendments to the bill. 31 Their product, the so-
called Mansfield-Dirksen substitute bill, was introduced by Senator
Dirksen on May 26 to break the filibuster by vote of cloture. It added
the seniority exemption contained in section 703(h).
"Bona fide" seniority systems were nowhere defined. Neither the
section itself nor the debates that followed elaborated on the mean-
ing. Senator Humphrey, who presented the bill, stated that the
addition of this section to the bill merely clarified its present intent
and effect, and would not narrow the scope of its application.32
Senator Dirksen, who submitted a written explanation, merely re-
peated its terms without elaboration. 33 No other Senator attempted
to debate or amend the substitute measure, and the bill passed as
presented. Whatever the reason for each Senator's vote on Title VII,
the April 8 memoranda could not possibly be the Senate's interpre-
tation of the exemption language which was first introduced on May
26, 1964, nearly seven weeks later. 34
29. Id. at 7212-15. The memorandum declared:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospec-
tive and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating
in the past and as a result has an all-white working force, when the title comes into
effect the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a nondis-
criminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or, indeed, permitted-to . . . give
[Negroes] special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier.
30. Id. at 7217. One question and answer were as follows:
Question: Would the same situation prevail in respect to promotions, when that
management function is governed by a labor contract calling for promotions on the
basis of seniority? What of dismissals? Normally, labor contracts call for "last
hired, first fired". If the last hired are Negroes, is the employer discriminating if
his contract requires they be first fired and the remaining employees are white?
Answer: Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a "last
hired, first fired" agreement a Negro happens to be the "last hired," he can still
be "first fired" as long as it is done because of his status as "last hired" and not
because of his race.
Id. at 7217.
31. Vaas, supra note 19, at 443.
32. 110 CONG. REc. 12723 (1964), reprinted in BNA OPERATIONS MANUAL: THE CIvIL RIGHTS
AcT OF 1964, at 302 (1964) [hereinafter cited as BNA MANUAL].
33. 110 CONG. REc. 12817-20 (1964), reprinted in BNA MANUAL, supra note 32, at 292.
34. The memoranda were inserted in the record several weeks before section 703(h) was
drafted. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 10, at 1609-10.
A literal reading of the three documents would seem to assert that Title VII would have no
effect on established seniority rights. Several courts have rejected this notion as inconsistent
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This kind of legislative history can be all things to all persons,
depending on which portions the reader wishes to rely upon most
heavily to support his position. Numerous courts and writers have
given dispositive weight to the April 8 documents to support a broad
exemption for seniority systems.35 Others, including the Supreme
Court, have discounted portions of the Congressional Record where
they appear to be in conflict with the broad purposes of the legisla-
tion .3
The 1972 Amendments
The inadequacies of the 1964 legislative history may have been
remedied, to some extent, when Congress amended Title VII in
1972. 31 Although these amendments primarily gave the EEOC the
power it lacked under the original statute to enforce its findings of
discrimination, 3 the legislative history accompanying the 1972
amendments is significant. The seniority exemption remained un-
changed, but this history is a statement by a Congress with a far
more sophisticated understanding of the pervasive effects of em-
ployment discrimination. 9 The legislative intent acknowledges that
discrimination is not an isolated series of independent actions, but
a complex scheme involving employers and labor organizations with
the ability to set policies, establish hiring, firing and promotion
procedures, and draft collective bargaining agreements covering vir-
tually every phase of an employee's activities.
The solidification of practices which perpetuate the effects of ear-
lier discrimination is a powerful weapon not easily combated by
with the overall congressional purpose. E.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); United States v. Bethlehem Steel,
446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
35. Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local Unions IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975),
vacated, 425 U.S. 987 (1976); Watkins v. Steelworkers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975);
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997
(1976); Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). See also Note, Last-Hired, First-Fired: Discriminatory or
Sacrosanct?, 80 DICK. L. REv. 747 (1976); Note, The Survival of "Last Hired, First Fired"
under Title VII and Section 1981, 6 Loy. CHI. L.J. 386 (1975).
36. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971). See also Cooper & Sobol, supra note 10; Poplin, supra note 2.
37. The Eaual Emvlovment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. IV 1974).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. IV 1974). The amendments provide, inter alia, authoriza-
tion for the EEOC to bring suits in federal district courts, seek preliminary injunctive relief,
and intervene in private actions; authorization for the EEOC to file charges in behalf of
aggrieved persons; and expanded jurisdiction.
39. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1972); S. REP. No. 415, 92nd Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1972).
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precise statutory formulations. By 1972 Congress realized this, and
emphatically reaffirmed the extensive power of the courts to fashion
remedies which would not only eliminate discriminatory practices,
but also, insofar as possible, restore victims to the positions they
would have held absent the discrimination.40 Implicit in this affir-
mation is a rejection of the kinds of limitations found in the Clark-
Case memorandum and the other statements of April 8, 1964. The
understanding of Title VII evidenced in those statements was that
it would have no effect on seniority rights accruing before the pas-
sage of the Act." If accepted, this position would severely restrict
the power of the courts to fashion relief in many circumstances
where the objectives of the Act could not be achieved without a
seniority award to victims of discrimination. The availability of
seniority relief under Title VII had been recognized by the courts
long before the 1972 amendments, and these court awards of senior-
ity significantly affected pre-1964 seniority rights. Congressional
recognition of the continuing applicability of these decisions after
the 1972 amendments is convincing evidence that the April 8 memo-
randa are a poor indication of congressional intent. 42
COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF TITLE VII
Court challenges to seniority systems have arisen in three impor-
tant contexts: first, cases involving segregated plants which main-
tained separate seniority rosters for blacks and whites;43 second,
cases in which union hiring hall policies came under fire;44 and most
recently, litigation spawned by the economic recession arising out
of the "last hired, first fired" provisions of seniority contracts. 41
40. Section-by-Section Analysis, supra note 12, at 7168.
41. See notes 28-30 supra.
42. For example, Representative Perkins noted, "In any area where the new law does not
address itself. . . it was assumed that the present case law as developed by the courts would
continue to govern the applicability and construction of Title VII." 118 CONG. REC. 7564
(1972) (remarks of Representative Perkins).
43. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Georgia Power
Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d
Cir. 1971); Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va.
1968).
44. Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Local 46,
Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers, 471 F.2d 408, 413 (2d Cir. 1973); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d
315, 329 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1970).
But see Note, Last-Hired, First-Fired: Discriminatory or Sacrosanct?, 80 DICK. L. REv. 747,
761 (1976).
45. Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local Unions IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975),
vacated, 425 U.S. 987 (1976); Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied sub nom. Automobile Workers, Local 862 v. Ford Motor Co., 425 U.S. 998 (1976);
890 [Vol. 8
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These disputes form the backdrop for the Supreme Court's decisions
on the relief provisions of Title VII. A 1971 case involving an em-
ployer's hiring requirements, and not seniority, afforded the Court
an opportunity to discuss the anti-discrimination provisions of the
Act and the scope of relief available thereunder."e However, the
Supreme Court squarely considered the seniority exemption of Title
VII for the first time in its 1976 decision, Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co.47
The Segregated Plant Cases
Strict, formal segregation of industrial plants was a widespread
phenomenon, particularly in the South, before the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 became effective." Commonly, whole departments or lowly
jobs within departments were filled only by blacks. Their promotion
opportunities were restricted to black-only posts, and separate sen-
iority rosters were maintained. When employers abandoned this
practice and merged the departments and the seniority rosters,
blacks found themselves on the bottom of the formerly white-only
lists, despite their greater length of service with the employer.49
Quarles v. Philip Morris Inc. I" was the first challenge to a depart-
mental seniority system. In 1966, the defendant employer, who had
previously maintained overtly segregated departments, allowed
blacks to transfer to all-white departments. However, their seniority
in the black departments was disregarded for purposes of computing
seniority in their new positions. This use of job or departmental
seniority meant that the blacks' entry was on the same terms as new
employees. The district court found that the difference between
black seniority and white seniority was based not on differences in
qualifications, but on the past segregation." The court ordered the
employer to discontinue the use of the departmental seniority sys-
tem, and to permit blacks to compete with whites for future vacan-
cies on the basis of their total plant seniority."
Watkins v. Steelworkers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
46. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
47. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
48. See generally R. MARSHALL, THE NEGRO AND ORGANIZED LABOR 183-91 (1965); Dewey,
Negro Employment in Southern Industry, 60 J. POL. ECON. 279 (1952); Cooper & Sobol, supra
note 10, at 1615-16.
49. A discussion of the departmental and plantwide seniority systems appears in S. SLI-
CHTrER, J. HEALY & E. LIVFRNASH, supra note 1, at 116 passim.
50. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
51. Id. at 513.
52. Id. at 520-21.
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In imposing a plantwide seniority system, the court concluded
that a "bona fide" seniority system is one that, at least, lacks dis-
criminatory effect. 53 Thus, the section 703(h) exemption could not
validate the company's intentional discriminatory practices that
existed before 1966. Such a literal reading of the legislative history
might prevent the court from granting the relief necessary to pre-
vent continuing discrimination. Although the court did not author-
ize affirmative hiring relief, the court found that Congress had not
fully considered the problems of a departmental seniority system.
Judge Butzner concluded, "Congress did not intend to freeze an
entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns
that existed before the act." 4
The court suggested, however, that the rationale for striking down
departmental or job seniority may not apply to plantwide systems. 51
Tiptoeing into untested waters, the judge may have felt compelled
to restrict his holding to invalidate only a departmental seniority
system. In doing so, he created an unfounded distinction between
departmental and plantwide systems that courts have relied upon
ever since. This is not to say that no distinction exists; rather, there
is no basis for ruling that the Act permits relief in the one instance
and denies it in the other.
A seniority system, although plantwide, may contain the seeds of
invidious discrimination to the same degree as a departmental sys-
tem. Although it takes full account of all time worked by black
employees in determining their position relative to white employees,
it also reflects past discriminatory hiring and promotion decisions.
Exclusionary hiring practices, in the absence of relief, relegate
blacks to lower positions in the seniority roster after these practices
terminate. In addition, experience in one position is often required
before progression to the next is permitted. Since blacks have only
recently been hired and permitted to work in these more desirable
departwients, they will lack the skills and experience to compete
effectively with whites. Thus, the disparate impact continues even
after the mechanisms of discrimination are removed.
One of the most influential decisions in this area is Local 189,
United Papermakers v. United States." This case posed a problem
similar to that in Quarles, but the employer had already merged its
segregated job progression lines at the time suit was brought. How-
53. Id. at 517.
54. Id. at 516.
55. Id.
56. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
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ever, the highest level black job in the plant was one step below the
lowliest white level job in the new integrated departments. As a
result of the merger, the entire black job progression ladder was
"tacked" onto the bottom of the white job progression ladder. Con-
sequently, blacks with many years experience held lowlier jobs than
did new white employees. Judge Wisdom, writing for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, struck down this merger because it inherently carried forward
the effects of the company's former discriminatory practices. 7 He
ordered the company to institute a plantwide seniority system in
lieu of its departmental system, so that equally skilled blacks and
whites, in bidding for jobs at the next higher level, would be able
to rely upon their total employment at the plant.
The decision in Local 189 was limited to the issue of invalidating
job or departmental seniority systems in formerly segregated plants.
However, its influence extended further. In a long passage of dicta,
Judge Wisdom discussed the effects of a discriminatory refusal to
hire, an issue that was not presented for the court's review.58 He
concluded that a black who had been refused a job because of race,
if hired later by that employer, could not claim to have greater
seniority than whites who were hired after his rejection. The court
asserted: "It is one thing for legislation to require the creation of
fictional seniority for newly hired Negroes, and quite another thing
for it to require that time actually worked in Negro jobs be given
equal status with time worked in white jobs."59 But to deny seniority
credit to blacks who attempted to work and were prevented from
doing so by the employer's discriminatory hiring practices has a
curious effect. It effectively grants relief to blacks who have only
been partially deprived of equal employment opportunities, but
denies relief to the most serious victims: those prevented from work-
ing at all.
As one commentator"° has suggested, the court's willingness to
order employers to compute seniority on a plantwide basis is a form
of fictional seniority. It grants blacks the seniority they would have
had if they had worked in the more desirable departments. As a
result, the same problem presents itself in both the departmental
and plantwide seniority systems: present and future employment
decisions that are nondiscriminatory simply cannot be made with-
out altering the seniority expectations of white employees.
57. Id. at 988.
58. Id. at 995.
59. Id.
60. Note, Last Hired, First Fired Layoffs and Title VII, 88 HAsv. L. REv. 1544, 1566 (1975).
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The Union Hiring Hall Cases
In most construction trades, contracts are negotiated between the
majority of the contractors in the area and the local union represent-
ing the journeymen in a particular craft. When a contractor needs
workers for a job, he usually, and in some cases must, contact the
union hiring hall which selects the workers and refers them to the
contractor. Under this system, priority is often given to workers with
a certain amount of experience on union jobs.' This ability of craft
unions to control work opportunities through their referral system
led to invidious discrimination. At one time, total exclusion of
blacks from unions meant exclusion from these union-controlled job
opportunities. Once unions were integrated, however, the discrimi-
nation took the form of priority to whites in job referral because of
lack of experience of blacks in previous union-controlled jobs.
Blacks who had the requisite experience, but in nonunion jobs, were
prevented by the unions' prior exclusionary practices from compet-
ing effectively for union jobs after they were allowed to use the
hiring halls. Finding the referral rules of hiring halls violative of
Title VII, the courts uniformly ordered the unions to alter these
rules so that workers with the requisite experience would receive top
job priority, regardless of whether that experience was gained on
union or non-union jobs.6" The courts were able to fashion these
remedies with little or no reference to the legislative history of Title
VII. Indeed, the courts readily imposed racial quotas and explicitly
permitted relief to blacks who were not the actual victims of the
unions' prior discrimination. 3
The Last Hired, First Fired Layoff Cases
The hard-fought gains of minorities and women in the area of
equal employment have eroded substantially in the wake of this
nation's recent recession and its lingering effects. Many triumphs
61. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 10, at 1624.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
See also cases listed at note 45 supra.
63. See Rios v. Steamfitters, Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Masonry Contractors Ass'n, 497 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Metal Lathers
Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Ironwork-
ers, Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1871). See generally
Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and Law in Labor Relations: Three Dimensions of Equal
Opportunity, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 675 (1974); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. Rv. 59 (1972);
Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 723 (1974);
Poplin, supra note 2, at 230-34; Sheeran, supra note 21, at 440-47; Note, Constitutionality of
Remedial Minority Preferences in Employment, 56 MINN. L. Rv. 842 (1972).
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over discrimination became hollow ones for persons who were laid
off their jobs pursuant to "last hired, first fired" seniority provisions
in collective bargaining agreements. While such systems may be
nondiscriminatory on their face, their impact is greatest on minori-
ties, for seniority is often directly related to prior discriminatory
hiring practices.
1. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works 4 was the first of several unsuc-
cessful attempts to challenge the use of last hired, first fired senior-
ity principles. Plaintiff Waters was a black bricklayer hired by Wis-
consin Steel in 1964, the first year that company had hired any
black bricklayers. Waters had previously sought employment there
in 1957. The company's collective bargaining agreement required
ninety days service before workers achieved contractual seniority
rights. Before Waters could complete this probationary period, he
was laid off with other bricklayers when the company forecast a
decrease in its bricklaying needs.15
After Waters' initial layoff, Wisconsin Steel and the union negoti-
ated a severance pay agreement with eight white bricklayers who
had also been' laid off. The agreement allowed them to either retain
their contractual seniority rights or forfeit those rights and receive
severance pay. The eight workers all elected the severance pay op-
tion. Later, the company realized it had underestimated its brick-
laying requirements, and believed it had done an injustice to the
eight workers. Accordingly, the company and the union entered into
an amendatory agreement partially nullifying the prior severance
pay agreement and restoring the contractual seniority rights of those
eight workers for purposes of recall. As a result, three of the eight
white workers accepted the recall and returned to work before Wa-
ters was recalled.66
Plaintiff7 alleged those actions by the company and union vio-
64. 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
65. Reinstated in 1967, he worked for three months, and was laid off a second time. In
1966, he filed charges with the EEOC. Fearful of prejudicing the outcome of his EEOC claim,
Waters declined to work when recalled a second time. He had also taken a position with
another employer by this time. Id. at 1313.
66. Wisconsin Steel also had a policy of permitting bricklayers without contractual senior-
ity to be recalled according to their length of service. This was the basis of Waters' recall. Id.
67. Actually, there were two plaintiffs. Waters' co-plaintiff, Samuels, had applied for a
job with the company prior to the execution of the amendatory agreement. He was never
hired. Id. at 1312.
68. Section 1981 reads: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . and to
19771 895
Loyola University Law Journal
lated Title VII and section 1981.68 The district court first found the
amendatory agreement between the company and the union racially
discriminatory. It further concluded that the company's seniority
system was the product of a pre-Act pattern of racial discrimina-
tion. Consequently, the court held that the system was not bona fide
under Title VII. Further, it found that both the agreement and the
seniority system violated section 1981.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding of discrimi-
nation and agreed that the amendatory agreement violated both
Title VII and section 1981.9 However, it disagreed with plaintiff's
contention that the seniority system perpetuated the pre-Act dis-
crimination and was thus invalid under both statutes. The court
found that "Title VII speaks only to the future. Its backward gaze
is found only on a present practice which may perpetuate past dis-
crimination." 0 It was noted that a seniority system based on the last
hired, first fired principle does not of itself perpetuate past discrimi-
nation, and that Wisconsin Steel's was a plantwide system.7 From
its examination of the legislative history of Title VII, the court con-
cluded that a plantwide or employment seniority system is bona fide
under the Act. The section 1981 claim was dismissed in a footnote,
the court asserting that once the system passed scrutiny under Title
VII, it was not violative of section 1981.72
Several problems with the Seventh Circuit's analysis surface
immediately. First, there is the court's misplaced reliance on the
departmental-plantwide distinction, a distinction probably never
valid in the first place and certainly not supported by the legislative
history of Title VII. This distinction was at least relevant in the
early segregated plant cases. But most layoff cases are an outgrowth
of exclusionary hiring practices, a fundamentally different violation
than one where the employer has hired minorities, but relegated
them to inferior positions and computed their seniority separately.
Yet once more, the judiciary's reluctance to award seniority to per-
sons not actually hired penalizes those most seriously victimized by
employers' past discriminatory practices.
the full and equal benefit of all laws . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens. 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1970).
69. 502 F.2d at 1320. The court found that the amendatory agreement was not discrimina-
tory as to Waters' co-plaintiff Samuels, who was never hired. There seems to be no logical
basis for this. It appears to be a result of the court's refusal to recognize harm done to one
who has not actually worked for the employer.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1318.
72. Id. at 1320.
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The Waters court considered seniority awards to minorities pre-
viously excluded from employment as preferential treatment and
noted that "Title VII was not designed to nurture such reverse dis-
criminatory preferences."7 Concededly, the Act does not mandate
reverse discrimination." But no plausible construction of the Act
should prevent an award of retroactive seniority to a person who has
been discriminatorily refused employment on the grounds that such
award constitutes reverse discrimination. Indeed, a form of relief
which comes much closer to a traditional perception of reverse dis-
crimination, namely, court-imposed racial quotas, has been widely
applied by the same circuits who decline to grant retroactive senior-
ity.75
The decision also appears to rely on the unstated presumption
that the seniority expectations of white workers under plantwide
systems deserve more deference than under departmental systems.
Yet, there is a substantial body of case law which recognizes that
seniority rights are not indefeasibly vested property rights, but may
be altered to further public policy. These cases make no distinction
among various types of seniority rights.
In rejecting an award of constructive seniority, the Waters court
placed a great deal of emphasis on parts of the legislative history of
Title VII, as well as on the Local 189 dicta. Both Quarles and Local
189 had suggested the distinction between departmental and plant-
wide seniority systems because an analysis of the apparent legisla-
tive intent could not otherwise justify an award of seniority relief in
the departmental seniority cases before them. The April 8 state-
ments appeared to be a substantial barrier to judicial interference
with seniority rights. To circumvent this, the courts invented an
artificial distinction that would enable them to grant seniority relief
when blatant internal discrimination existed. Whether this analysis
can be extended to other uses of seniority is questionable.
The Waters decision raises another problem that has reappeared
in subsequent decisions: the abrupt dismissal of a section 1981
charge after a substantive ruling on the Title VII allegation. The
desire to avoid inconsistent rulings on the two claims is understand-
able, but not easily forgivable. The statutes have been consistently
73. Id.
74. Section 703(j) of the Act provides: "Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted
to require any employer, employment agency, [or] labor organization . ..to grant preferen-
tial treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin of such individual or group. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
75. See note 63 supra.
76. See note 12 supra.
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construed as completely independent avenues of redress.77 In one
such decision, the Supreme Court noted, "It is well settled . . . that
§ 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private
employment on the basis of race."78 Thus, it seems quite reasonable
that the uncertainties in Title VII's legislative history should not
bar relief under section 1981.11
2. Watkins v. Steelworkers Local 2369
The Fifth Circuit ruled on the Title VII validity of reverse senior-
ity layoff systems in Watkins v. Steelworkers Local 2369.0 In that
case, black workers at a Continental Can Company plant charged
that its last hired, first fired seniority system unlawfully perpetu-
ated the effects of the company's earlier discriminatory practices.
Prior to 1965, the company hired no blacks, with the exception of
two hired during World War II. Extensive layoffs beginning in 1971
meant that all blacks but those hired during wartime lost their jobs.
The layoffs also affected whites with seniority dating back to 1951;
nevertheless, the first 138 persons on the recall list were white.
Blacks who were laid off instituted a class action under both Title
VII and section 1981, and the district court held that application of
the company's presently neutral seniority system violated both stat-
utes because blacks, as a class, had been precluded from gaining
seniority. The last hired, first fired application perpetuated the ef-
fects of the company's prior unlawful practices.
The court of appeals reversed, basing its primary analysis on two
factors: (1) the Local 189 dicta, which viewed seniority relief for new
employees as preferential treatment; and (2) the fact that plaintiffs,
with one exception, were not old enough to have been in the work
force before the company ceased its discriminatory hiring practices.
Again, as in Waters, the first basis of the court's decision inappro-
priately applies the plantwide-departmental seniority distinction.
With the second factor, the court seems to require that plaintiffs be
actual victims of the employer's discrimination, although Title VII
contains no such requirement. Other courts, including the Watkins
77. E.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The Watkins court acknowledged this.
78. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. at 459-60.
79. See generally Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Dis-
crimination in Private Employment, 7 HAIv. C.R.-C.L. REv. 56, 68-84 (1972); Note, The
Expanding Scope of Section 1981: Assault on Private Discrimination and a Cloud on Affirma-
tive Action, 90 Hnav. L. REV. 412 (1976); Note, The Survival of "Last Hired, First Fired"
under Title VII and Section 1981, 6 Loy. Cm. L.J. 386 (1975); Comment, Is Section 1981
Modified by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1223, 1235.
80. 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
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district court, have recognized discrimination as a class violation
and granted class-based relief." If the Fifth Circuit based its holding
on plaintiffs' lack of standing to represent the true victims, this was
not articulated.
The Watkins court also gave short shrift to the section 1981 claim.
Once it found the seniority system valid under Title VII, the court
refused to consider the section 1981 allegation separately, citing
Waters as support.2 It has been argued that Watkins may represent
the outer limits of Title VII relief available in a seniority context.13
Plaintiffs' inability to show that they personally had been victims
of the employer's hiring discrimination was a complete bar to relief.
Proof of the violation was not enough.
3. Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. IBEW Local Unions
Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. IBEW Local Unions4 arose
in an unusual factual context. There, the employer sought a decla-
ratory judgment from the district court to resolve apparent conflicts
between its collective bargaining agreement, containing a last hired,
first fired seniority provision, and an EEOC conciliation agreement,
requiring the employer to hire an established proportion of minority
and female workers. The company announced a layoff in 1974, and
sought the declaratory judgment to determine exactly who would be
laid off. The district court held that the seniority provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement could not be construed so as to
frustrate the purpose of the EEOC conciliation agreement. To the
extent the two were in conflict, the conciliation agreement con-
trolled. Thus, the court required that the EEOC-imposed ratio of
minority and female workers existing before the layoff announce-
ment be maintained throughout the layoff period.
The Third Circuit reversed, finding no express conflict between
the two contracts. Because the EEOC agreement referred only to
hiring requirements, it was not controlling on the layoff question.
In response to arguments that such seniority provisions are contrary
to public policy and against the general welfare, the court ruled that
"Title VII reveals no statutory proscription of plant-wide seniority
systems. To the contrary, Title VII authorizes the use of 'bona fide'
seniority systems."85 The court found that a system could be bona
81. E.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 132 (8th Cir. 1969);
Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 247-48 (10th Cir. 1970).
82. 516 F.2d at 50.
83. Poplin, supra note 2, at 229.
84. 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 425 U.S. 987 (1976).
85. Id. at 705.
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fide even if it continues the effect of past employment discrimina-
tion, and cited portions of the legislative history for support." It
determined that "a facially neutral company-wide seniority system,
without more, is a bona fide seniority system ... "I'
The problems with the Third Circuit's opinion are manifold. It
continued the dubious plantwide-departmental seniority distinc-
tion; cited the legislative history of Title VII; and extended the
Quarles-Local 189 rationale to presume plantwide systems bona fide
per se. The court held that, once it found the system bona fide, any
evidence of discrimination appearing in the record would not be
probative to show a Title VII violation.8 Unfortunately, unlike
Waters and Watkins, there was evidence to show that the company
had continued its discriminatory hiring practices after the enact-
ment of Title VII.9 Thus, the analogy to the earlier cases was not
necessary or required. However, in the unusual procedural setting
of a declaratory judgment action, the victims of this post-Title VII
discrimination could not be parties.
Judge Garth, writing for the court, also held that specific intent
to discriminate was the only factor which rendered an otherwise
"bona fide" seniority system violative of Title VII.9" This clearly
conflicts with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the intent
provisions of Title VII enunciated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.:
that employers and labor unions need only intend the consequences
of their actions. 9'
4. The Second Circuit's Approach
Acha v. Beam e92 was a Title VII class action suit brought by
female police officers laid off by the New York City Police Depart-
ment in the wake of that city's fiscal crisis. They complained that
the seniority system, with its last hired, first fired layoff provision,
violated Title VII because it perpetuated past discriminatory hiring
practices. Prior to 1973, women were hired only for the job title
Policewoman, for which there was an official quota amounting to
86. In quoting extensively from the April 8 memoranda, the court noted: "We believe that
the legislative statements made prior to the introduction of § 703(h) and dealing directly with
seniority systems are entitled to weight in interpreting congressional intent. Id. at 707
n.56.
87. Id. at 710. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily disposed of the case
by reversing and remanding for proceedings consistent with Franks. 425 U.S. 987 (1976).
88. Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. IBEW Local Unions, 508 F.2d 687, 706 (3d Cir.
1975), vacated, 425 U.S. 987 (1976).
89. Id. at 694.
90. Id. at 704-06.
91. 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
92. 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976).
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1.34 percent of the total number of police officers. Thereafter, job
titles were merged and examinations and training were identical.
However, the Police Department adopted an appointment ratio of
four men to one woman. Thus, men who had received lower scores
than women on identical examinations received earlier appoint-
ments to the force.
The Second Circuit ruled that if a female police officer could show
that, except for her sex, she would have been hired early enough to
accumulate sufficient seniority to withstand current layoffs, such
layoff violated Title VII 3 In other words, the court awarded con-
structive seniority to these victims of prior discriminatory hiring
practices. The court rejected defendants' contention that this award
of constructive seniority was precluded by the section 703(h) exemp-
tion. Significantly, the court refused to restrict its consideration to
the memoranda of April 8, finding the legislative history of this
section sufficiently cloudy to warrant reliance on Title VII's general
purposes and policies."
In identifying those women eligible for seniority relief, the court
did not limit the class to women who applied for or inquired about
positions after the effective date of Title VII. Presumably, a woman
who initially inquired about employment before 1965, and was sub-
sequently hired, could be awarded seniority retroactive to the date
of her initial inquiry. Since the class represented by plaintiffs in-
cluded only laid off police officers, the court did not address the
problem of women who applied for positions, but were never hired
because of the restrictive hiring quotas. Nor was it necessary to
address the question of relief for women who would have applied for
positions, but for their knowledge of those restrictive quotas.
A much broader class of plaintiffs was involved in another Second
Circuit decision, Chance v. Board of Examiners.15 Although the case
was brought under section 1981, and not Title VII, the court relied
almost exclusively on Title VII case law. This class action attacked
layoffs of supervisory personnel in the New York City school system.
Plaintiffs were composed of two groups: supervisors who acquired
their positions after judicial invalidation of a discriminatory exami-
nation which they had taken and failed; and supervisors who also
acquired their positions after the examination was invalidated, but
who had "failed to apply for or take such supervisory examination
93. Id. at 654. The district court, in a brief memorandum opinion, held that defendants
could not have acted illegally in following the mandates of the New York Civil Service Law,
which established a bona fide seniority system. Id. at 650.
94. Id. at 654.
95. 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), on rehearing, 534 F.2d 1007 (1976).
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because they reasonably believed [it] to be discriminatory and
unrelated to job performance."96 The court ruled that both groups
were entitled to constructive seniority relief, potentially enabling
them to withstand the layoffs.
The award of relief to persons who had not taken the examination
marked a clear departure from the more confining standards enun-
ciated by other circuits. It should be noted, however, that the deci-
sion to award relief to the latter group was made after the Supreme
Court's Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.97 opinion. Initially
the court of appeals had denied relief to the group that had not
taken the examination.
The Supreme Court Cases: Griggs and Franks
1. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.9" was not a seniority case, but presented
the Supreme Court with an opportunity to discuss broadly the
objectives of Title VII and permissible remedial action. The Court
invalidated the company's requirement of a high school diploma
and a passing score on a general intelligence test as conditions for
employment. Evidence showed that the company had engaged in
exclusionary hiring practices before passage of Title VII. Further-
more, the test was shown to have a discriminatory impact on minor-
ities, which could not be justified by a showing of business necessity.
The Court held:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII . . . was
to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove bar-
riers that have operated in the past to favor . . . white employ-
ees. . . . Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on
their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be main-
tained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discrimi-
natory employment practices."
The Supreme Court determined that Congress directed the thrust
of the Act to the consequences of the employment practices, not
simply to the motivation of the employer. I0 This "consequence test"
has subsequently been relied upon by lower courts in finding the
existence of employment discrimination. Thus, production of statis-
96. Id. at 1007.
97. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
98. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
99. Id. at 429-30.
100. Id. at 432.
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tics showing a disproportionate number of minority employees af-
fected will usually warrant a finding of discrimination.'"
The Court discounted language in the statute and in the legisla-
tive history which seemingly required a finding of subjective intent
to discriminate on the part of the employer before a violation can
be found. Section 706(g) appears to require a court determination
that the employer or union has intentionally engaged in an unlawful
employment practice. °2 Similar language regarding intent can be
found in the exemption for bona fide seniority systems. Section
703(h) states that the exemption applies unless the differences cre-
ated by such seniority systems are the result of an intention to
discriminate.'"3 When the Court addressed the seniority issue di-
rectly five years later, it once again elected to reach a conclusion
that did not square with explicit language in the legislative history.
2. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.
The Court finally ruled on the question of retroactive or construc-
tive seniority as an appropriate Title VII remedy in Franks v. Bow-
man Transportation Co. 04 In that case, plaintiffs brought a class
action against Bowman and their unions alleging both Title VII and
section 1981 violations. The litigation involved several classes of
victims, one of which included black applicants for over-the-road
(OTR) truck driver positions who were victims of the company's
discriminatory refusal to hire blacks prior to 1972.'"5 The Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected the request for full seniority relief for the OTR appli-
cants, holding that section 703(h) precluded such relief as a matter
of law. The court found the seniority system "bona fide" and conse-
quently protected, despite the company's prior unlawful exclusion
of blacks from enjoying the benefits of the seniority system.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding constructive seniority an
appropriate relief for these plaintiffs. Finding this relief proper
under the remedial sections of the Act, particularly section 706(g),
the Court reaffirmed its earlier position: the central purpose of Title
VII was "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of
101. Note, Last-Hired, First-Fired: Discriminator, or Sacrosanct?, 80 DICK. L. REV. 747,
749 (1976).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970). See note 17 supra.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). See text accompanying note 18 supra.
104. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
105. This class was denominated Class 3. Class 4, to whom the appellate court did grant
seniority relief, consisted of company employees who had sought to transfer to OTR positions
prior to the same date. In the latter case, the facts were somewhat similar to those of the
segregated plant cases: blacks were only hired for menial positions, and not permitted to
transfer to the better jobs reserved for whites. Id. at 751-52.
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unlawful employment discrimination."' 6 The district court had
found that Bowman had continued to discriminate after the passage
of Title VII. Noting this finding, the Court concluded: "There is no
indication in the legislative materials that section 703(h) was in-
tended to modify or restrict relief otherwise appropriate once an
illegal discriminatory practice occurring after the effective date of
the Act is proved-as in the instant case, a discriminatory refusal
to hire."' 0 17 In addition to the fact that plaintiffs were victims of post-
Act discrimination, the Court characterized their status as
"identifiable victims" of illegal hiring practices. 10 Although the
Court never defined the term "identifiable victims," the class repre-
sented was composed only of persons who had submitted applica-
tions for employment or transfer. This may have been a key factor
in the Court's characterization.
The Supreme Court took full cognizance of the devastating im-
pact of seniority systems in perpetuating the effects of past discrimi-
nation. It recognized that a hiring order, even coupled with back-
pay, would be wholly inadequate in achieving the dual congressional
objectives of the remedial provisions of Title VII: to forbid discrimi-
nation and to compensate its victims without granting preferential
treatment to minorities. 09 However, the Court found that the con-
tinuing effects of discrimination must be shared among the employ-
ees. Thus, the relief sought and granted did not include "bumping"
whites who had been hired during the discriminatory period. The
Court recognized that an award of retroactive seniority "in no sense
constitutes complete relief. . . .""" The blacks in their new posi-
tions, even with seniority dating back to their original applications,
must still compete with a greater number of OTR drivers than they
would have in the absence of discrimination."'
In expressing its willingness to alter the structure of seniority
systems for the purpose of accommodating victims of discrimina-
tion, the Supreme Court also maintained that a sharing of the bur-
106. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763, citing Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
107. 424 U.S. at 761-62. The Court reached this conclusion after noting the absence of any
mention of seniority in the initial House bill or Judiciary Committee Report, as well as the
absence of any committee report accompanying the compromise bill which did contain the
seniority exemption. The majority opinion quoted at length from the April 8 memoranda but
apparently did so more to emphasize the unusual nature of the legislative materials than to
consider them as interpretative of the Act.
108. Id. at 779.
109. Section-by-Section Analysis, supra note 12, at 7565. See also notes 18 and 24 supra.
110. 424 U.S. at 777.
111. This has significant effects. The OTR drivers bid individually for upcoming trips on
the basis of their seniority. Poplin, supra note 2, at 216-17.
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den of past discrimination is "presumptively necessary.""' Blacks,
women, and other minorities, as the most deeply affected victims
of discrimination, have shouldered this burden alone in the past.
Despite the Supreme Court's direction, recent court decisions modi-
fying employee expectations under seniority systems are shifting
only a part of this burden to the white beneficiaries of this discrimi-
nation.
REMEDIES AFTER FRANKS: SHARING THE BURDEN
The Supreme Court's pre-Act/post-Act distinction in Franks may
insulate plantwide seniority systems of employers who did not en-
gage in overt discrimination after Title VII became effective. The
Franks decision may also signal a narrowing of the Court's earlier
pronouncement in Griggs. Griggs had seemed to suggest that senior-
ity systems which perpetuate the effects of pre-Act, as well as post-
Act, discrimination could not be considered bona fide. The Court
there ruled, "Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be main-
tained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discrimina-
tory employment practices."" 3 On the other hand, the Franks opin-
ion never discussed the .validity of seniority systems which perpetu-
ate the effects of pre-Act discrimination. In both Griggs and Franks
the Court elected to ignore certain portions of the legislative history
which could not be reconciled with its conclusion."' This may re-
strict the relevance of these disregarded portions in future cases.
But in doing so the Court left unresolved the possibility of broader
relief for seniority discrimination through the application of section
1981. As a result, despite this clear mandate to eliminate subtle as
well as overt discrimination, lower courts are reluctant to grant full
and total relief to minorities."'
Minorities as Victims
The possibility that minorities with newly acquired seniority may
"bump" incumbent employees was not foreclosed by the Court, but
112. 424 U.S. at 777.
113. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
114. See text accompanying notes 99-103 supra; see also note 107 and accompanying text
supra.
115. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 997 (1976), and Watkins v. Steelworkers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975) are
typical of cases refusing to analyze a section 1981 claim independently of a Title VII claim,
where doing so may well have achieved greater relief to the victims of discrimination. See
text accompanying notes 78-79, 82 supra.
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one court of appeals has refused to allow such relief.11 The prior
reliance of appellate courts on the April 8 statements reveals a pre-
disposition to leave white seniority rights undisturbed whenever
possible, thereby giving a broad construction to section 703(h). This
respect for seniority rights appears strongest where such rights are
acquired under a plantwide seniority system, rather than under a
departmental seniority system. That questionable distinction may
have been implicitly upheld by the Franks Court since its decision
focused on illegal hiring practices, rather than on the meaning of
"bona fide" seniority systems. The bona fide seniority system ques-
tion may resurface in future opinions.
One of the most significant aspects of the .Franks decision may be
the apparent adoption of an "identifiable victim" requirement. The
Court may have coined this term for the simple purpose of narrow-
ing its decision to the facts before it, not establishing a standing
requirement. Nevertheless, there is an indication that lower courts
are adopting the identifiable victim standard and denying relief to
those who fail to meet it."7 This approach requires two separate
factual determinations. First, the courts must determine the scope
of the standard. The most likely construction is that it will encom-
pass those who can show that, but for the employer's discriminatory
practices, they would have been hired, promoted, or transferred.
Chance v. Board of Examiners, 18 on rehearing after Franks, is an
excellent example of this approach. The court there ruled that iden-
tifiable victims included those who could show that, because they
reasonably believed that the supervisory examination was discrimi-
natory and unrelated to job performance, they failed to apply for or
take the examination. Once the examination requirement was inval-
idated by court order, the victims were promoted. Thereafter, they
sought retroactive seniority. Since plaintiffs were already supervi-
sors and had met the other requirements for the position, the court
had little difficulty in concluding that most of them could quality
for relief. Thus, the court found it reasonable to assume that at the
time plaintiffs first became eligible for supervisory posts, they
would have applied had it not been for their knowledge of the dis-
criminatory effects of the examination.
The fate of another group of victims in the hands of a court apply-
116. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
920 (1976).
117. E.g., Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 540 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1976); Schaeter v.
Tannian, 538 F.2d 1234 (6th Cir. 1976); Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 534 F.2d 1247 (7th
Cir. 1976).
118. 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), on rehearing, 534 F.2d 1007 (1976).
906 [Vol. 8
Seniority Systems
ing the identifiable victim standard is less clear. This is the class of
persons who would have applied for positions, transfers, or promo-
tions but for the employer's reputation and practice of not hiring or
promoting blacks or other minorities. Unlike the victims in Chance,
this group may never have received the positions, promotions, or
transfers they wanted. Admittedly the administrative problems at-
tending a court award to this group are significant, but not impossi-
ble to overcome.'19
The second decision to be made by trial courts applying an identi-
fiable victim standard is an allocation of the burden of proof. Need-
less to say, this decision could be critical for both the employer and
the alleged victims. Courts may shift the burden differently depend-
ing upon the nature of the class seeking relief. Where a plaintiff
demonstrates that the employer has engaged in a pattern of discrim-
ination, and that the plaintiff was actually rejected for employment,
the burden shifts to the employer to prove that either there were no
job openings at the time of plaintiff's application or that plaintiff
was not qualified for any openings that did exist. In such cases,
employers face an almost impossible burden of proof. However, in
cases where the plaintiff's position as an identifiable victim is less
certain, he may be forced to establish more before the burden will
shift to the defendant.
White Males as Victims
Each time a court awards constructive seniority to minorities, it
impairs the expectations of white male employees. These policy
considerations raised by the Franks majority prompted partial dis-
sents by Chief Justice Burger' 0 and Justice Powell."2 ' Both ex-
pressed concern over the fate of the white employees whose job
expectations would be jeopardized. Even if the whites were not
"bumped," the award of retroactive seniority increases the risk of
layoff and decreases the opportunity for promotion. Scarce benefits
allocated among the most senior employees must now be shared
with the discriminatees. Justice Powell assailed the majority ap-
proach as inflexible in creating a presumption in favor of retroactive
seniority awards.'22 He stated that the decision, in effect, requires
district courts not to weigh the equities in reaching a decision about
119. See Note, Last Hired, First Fired Layoffs and Title VII, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1544 (1975).
The author suggests that the class of potential victims could be defined in terms of age and
area of residence.
120. 424 U.S. at 780.
121. Id. at 781.
122. 424 U.S. 747, 781-99 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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appropriate remedies, despite a clear congressional mandate to do
SO.123
White employees whose seniority rights are altered by a court
order may well consider themselves victimized by the employer's
past discrimination, even if their union was instrumental in perpet-
uating the discrimination.' 21 Although the Franks Court reminded
the parties that seniority rights are not indefeasibly vested,, it did
not say that whites have no avenue of redress themselves. The in-
creasing frequency of court decisions that impair seniority rights of
employees may prompt some whites to seek to intervene in court
proceedings where their rights are at stake.' 26 More likely, perhaps,
they may file grievances with their unions. When collective bargain-
ing agreements are due to be renewed, they may seek assurances
that they will be compensated in the event that constructive senior-
ity is awarded to junior employees or to rejected job applicants.
The temptation may be great for some to disparage the "victim"
status of whites who have long enjoyed the benefits of their employ-
ers' past discrimination. Most would argue that their potential in-
jury is insubstantial when compared with the often irreparable in-
jury suffered by those denied employment altogether by the em-
ployer, or systematically assigned to the most menial, lowest paying
jobs. But this alone is no basis for denying relief to whites. If their
contractual rights or expectations have been seriously impaired
through no fault of their own, they deserve, at least, to have a
determination made of the extent of their rights, if any, against
their employer or union.
The Employer, the Union, and the Public
In light of these adverse effects on white employees, more creative
remedies are needed to make the employer or union bear the burden
for remedying their past acts of discrimination. Chief Justice
Burger, in his brief dissent in Franks, suggested a "front pay" award
instead of a retroactive seniority award."7 This monetary relief
would serve the dual purpose of deterring the wrongdoing employer
or union as well as protecting the rights of the innocent employees. 2
123. Id. at 790, 799.
124. The whites themselves may have been guilty of perpetuating the discrimination. The
appellate, court in Franks noted that white OTR drivers refused to share routes with blacks.
495 F.2d at 411.
125. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
126. See Cox v. Allied Chemical Corp., 382 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. La. 1974), modified, 538
F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1976).
127. 424 U.S. at 781 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
128. Id.
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The propriety of back pay relief in Title VII cases is well settled
since the Supreme Court's 1975 decision in Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody. 29 Under the broad principles enunciated there a "front pay"
award would probably fall within the scope of relief available under
section 706(g). Other suggestions for ways to allocate a more equita-
ble share of the burden to the wrongdoers include a special benefit
fund. In anticipation of layoffs, the employer might be required to
contribute to a fund which would be distributed to laid off employ-
ees. °'3 This money, when combined with union benefits and unem-
ployment compensation, could minimize the impact of the layoff on
both whites and blacks. Where long-term severance is expected, the
employer could be required to finance the cost of retraining laid off
employees for other occupations. 3'
Another suggestion, one that was ordered by the district court in
Watkins, is that the employer simply not lay off the employees. The
employer would have to retain both whites, who had sufficient sen-
iority to withstand the layoff before the blacks' seniority was recom-
puted, and blacks whose new constructive seniority enables them to
withstand the layoffs at the expense of the whites. This solution
could be disastrous for both the employer and the employees in a
marginal financial situation. However, a profitable, multimillion
dollar corporation with numerous plants, when considering a tem-
porary layoff at one plant, could sustain the impact of continuing
to pay all its employees during the slack period. A district court,
with its broad equitable powers under the Act, could naturally take
all these factors into account in constructing a remedy.
Much of what has been said about the employer's share of the
burden of past discrimination also applies to the unions. Under
Title VII they are liable for their own acts of discrimination.13 To a
certain extent, the union's role in establishing discriminatory pre-
Act seniority systems should determine their liability under Title
VII. Where the union has actually encouraged the employer's dis-
criminatory policies, it cannot complain when the court orders it to
share the cost of the award. Absent proof of such subjective intent,
the Court's Griggs standard for intent may be sufficient to hold
them liable. This might require proof only that the unions ac-
quiesced in the acts whose consequences resulted in discrimination.
In instances where union benefits are directly related to their mem-
129. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
130. Sheeran, supra note 21, at 461-63.
131. Id.
132. See note 16 supra.
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bers' seniority, the union should be required to readjust those bene-
fits to eliminate the continuing effects of past discrimination.
Further, it cannot be denied that discrimination has its roots in
societal prejudice. Employment discrimination is just one aspect of
a pervasive phenomenon that has scarred its victims in every aspect
of their lives: in social relationships, housing facilities, and educa-
tional opportunities, to name a few. It is perhaps not unfair if the
employers and unions attempt to pass on these costs of discrimina-
tion in the form of higher prices to the consuming public.
CONCLUSION
Although few assumptions are safe in an area as thorny as this,
at least one may be ventured with little risk of contradiction: the
unions will continue to fight hard in the courts for preservation of
seniority systems. Up to this time, the courts have shown no disposi-
tion for such sweeping reform as the abolition of seniority systems
by judicial fiat. Despite the recognition by some courts that insula-
tion of seniority systems from attack will preclude some victims of
discrimination from obtaining relief, and even though some judges
have substantially altered seniority expectations of employees, the
continued existence of the systems seems assured.
If taken as an index of future court decisions, the Supreme Court's
position in Franks may be disturbing and ultimately unsatisfying
not only for unions and employers, but for discrimination victims
as well. The Court seems to labor under the "all or nothing" as-
sumption that there are a limited number of full time positions to
be distributed among an always greater number of potential em-
ployees. This assumption has implications not only in layoff situa-
tions, but in hiring and promotion cases as well.
The prospect of continuing high unemployment is an important
reason for considering alternatives to the "all or nothing" approach.
The EEOC has suggested reduced workweeks, voluntary early re-
tirement, elimination of overtime work, and work sharing formu-
las. 33 Implementation of these approaches could open up more posi-
tions at higher levels as well as entry levels at which most employees
are hired. Minorities, with their newly acquired seniority, could
compete with white males for a greater number of promotional op-
portunties. The impact of a layoff could be greatly reduced as well.
To date the courts have shown little inclination to use their broad
powers in fashioning remedies that would be classified as radical by
earlier judicial standards. More creative solutions will have to come
133. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 101-03 (1975).
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from the courts if Title VII objectives are to be achieved. Reliance
upon legislative memoranda as a basis for denying relief to victims
of discrimination simply does not square with the broad objectives
of the Act. Formulating overly restrictive standards or imposing
impossible burdens of proof in defining victims of discrimination is
equally repugnant. And adoption of a pre-Act/post-Act standard for
relief where the effects of past discrimination are carried forward
into the present further frustrates achievement of Title VII objec-
tives.
Discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin has been outlawed for more than 100 years. Refusal to analyze
a claim under the older Civil Rights Act (section 1981) indepen-
dently of the new Act, when seniority systems are challenged, is
inconsistent with court decisions that recognize Title VII as a sup-
plemental avenue of relief. It was not intended to repeal the earlier
Act, but to increase opportunities for victims of discrimination to
seek redress.
One final consideration merits discussion. While a court should
never lose sight of the terrible scars borne by victims of past discrim-
ination, at the same time it should be acutely aware of the devastat-
ing effects of racial strife. It seems likely that any significant inter-
ference with the present structure of seniority systems will occasion
further bad feelings between organized labor and minority employ-
ees. This alone is not a sufficient reason to reject a remedy, and
warnings to the court that disruptive strikes or racial violence may
break out as a result of the court's order should not prevent the court
from imposing a necessary and just remedy. But the court might,
when tempted to impose an order of far-reaching effect for the liti-
gants, consider the possibility of allowing the parties to work out
their own solution. The prospect of an unpalatable court order may
be a sufficient stimulus. The court could of course retain jurisdiction
while the parties attempted a settlement. The valuable role of an
arbitrator could be considered as well. 134
When cases do arise, as they will, where all else fails and the court
is the final arbiter, the decisions thus far under Title VII will not
pose a bar to a more creative or far-reaching award of relief. The
courts have erected barriers, but they are not insurmountable. The
Supreme Court rendered a careful opinion in Franks addressed to
the facts of the case. That decision should not be read to preclude
relief to victims of pre-Act discrimination, under either Title VII or
134. Coulson, The Emerging Role of Title VI Arbitration, 26 LAB. L.J. 263 (1975).
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section 1981. Nor should it be read to require identifiable victims
in all cases to be the beneficiaries of the relief being sought. Rather,
it should be read as a mandate that minorities and whites, unions
and employers alike must share the burden of past discrimination
in as just a manner as a court can devise, and that continuing
scrutiny of seniority systems is crucial where they may harbor, how-
ever secretly, the vicious effects of that discrimination.
CAROL L. MCCULLY
AuTHOR's NOTE
After this article went to press, the United States Supreme Court
announced its decision in International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States, 45 U.S.L.W. 4506 (May 31, 1977). The United
States brought a "pattern or practice" suit against a company found
to have discriminated against blacks and Spanish-surnamed truck-
drivers, hiring them only as local drivers while the OTR positions
all went to whites. This author, in urging that a distinction between
plantwide and departmental seniority systems is unfounded, never
expected the Court to express its agreement by effectively upholding
the latter type and overturning the unanimous conclusion of the
appellate courts, the EEOC, and legal scholars. The Court ruled
that maintaining separate seniority rosters for local and OTR driv-
ers was not unlawful, despite its "locking-in" effect on minorities.
The Court also ruled definitively that no seniority relief would be
available to victims of pre-Act discrimination. The only respite af-
forded victims of discrimination from the devasting impact of the
decision is the Court's ruling that failure to apply for a "white-only"
job was not a bar to an award of retroactive seniority. A person who
could show that he was a potential victim of unlawful discrimina-
tion (e.g., he would have applied but for the knowledge of the futil-
ity of such an effort) will be treated as an applicant, and thus
presumptively entitled to relief. The burden would then shift to the
employer in the same manner as when a rejected applicant has
shown the employer's practice of discrimination.
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